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ABSTRACT 
Departing from the discourse on whether a specific 
(social, ethical) responsibility is attached to the 
creation and manipulation of algorithms, this article 
questions the prerequisite of having an identity of 
algorithms to which that responsibility could be 
attached. After showing that such identity is partly 
fictional due to the fact that algorithms are connected 
to other algorithms and their identity is always a 
selective reading of a series of transitions through 
which algorithms come into existence, the 
perspective is shifted to the algorithmic as the 
medium of algorithms and as the actual agential 
domain. This shift translates responsibility into the 
ability to respond to otherness and non-identity 
through sensitive forms of alignment. Comparing the 
algorithmic with the desiring-machines of Deleuze 
and Guattari, this article proposes that its dynamics 
of flows and interruptions could be artistically 
reflected as halting operations that controvert the 
superficial evaluation of algorithms, for example 
under the classical decision problem or halting 
problem. A possible strategy for making the inner 
dynamics perceivable is proposed through a 
balancing act between the credible and the incredible, 
the plausible and the implausible. 
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1 | PREAMBLE: TALKING PAST EACH OTHER 
This article being a consequence of a presentation at 
the 2017 xCoAx conference, I would like to begin with 
a reaction I received to that presentation. The original 
pivot had been the question of the ethics of 
algorithms: The two extreme positions, as I see them, 
are on the one hand that algorithms are simply the 
formulation of a set of instructions to perform a 
calculation, and consequently there is no such thing 
as a general responsibility worth to discuss; on the 
other hand, algorithms embody power structures and 
control systems, so they are inherently political, and 
on the way to AI singularity they will be increasingly 
standing in opposition to our freedom and self-
determination. Now, my argument was, and it will be 
taken up again here, that we should not reduce the 
possible space of this question to a one-dimensional 
line with the two mentioned positions at its ends, but 
rather find something orthogonal by means of 
rethinking what algorithms actually are—or, if that 
sounds too ontological, how they operate and 
effectuate. This in turn drew the ire of Frieder Nake 
and Philip Galanter for whom the status of algorithms 
had been unambiguously historically established. 
Galanter argued that the term “iron” had been used in 
early historical periods in an imprecise way, but that 
later a precise definition had been established, and 
by analogy we should not dissolve the already 
precisely known term algorithm [1]. Nake seemed 
particularly upset about a new “mysticism” 
surrounding algorithms, an attitude where people 
attribute all sorts of irrational powers to algorithms. 
I am very much aware of the narrow computer 
scientific definitions of an algorithm, although one 
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should add that there is no single uncontested 
definition (cf. Gurevich, 2012). However, one should 
acknowledge that algorithms have escaped the 
sphere of competence of computer scientists and are 
relevant for artists, philosophers, sociologists, 
biologists, etc., with each of these domains describing 
and manipulating aspects that necessarily go beyond 
a canonical minimalist definition by a computer 
scientist. These latter definitions are still useful, but 
not sufficient to address the aesthetic and social 
impact of algorithms. Perhaps it helps to emphasise 
that I am not interested in “the” algorithm, but in what 
I had unwieldily called “algorithmicity”. A simpler way 
would be to say “the algorithmic”, that is, the 
dynamics and agency unfolded by algorithmic 
practices. An inevitable result of this perspective is, 
however, that the notion of “the” algorithm becomes 
relatively useless. 
 
2 | DOES “THE” ALGORITHM HAVE AN 
IDENTITY? 
Under closer inspection, the criticised mystification of 
algorithms goes hand in hand with a strong sense of 
algorithms as clearly delineated objects. Their 
abstract nature is compensated by imagining 
algorithms to have a stable identity. It may appear in 
titles, “…in the Age of the Algorithm”, or in truisms, 
“The computer cannot tell us anything substantial 
about life…” [2] This is reinforced by the Big Data 
economy, in which a company’s value depends on its 
ability to convince others that “their algorithm” 
performs exceedingly well, or where “one” 
algorithm—in a search engine, on a social media 
platform—is upgraded to “another”. 
The classical notion of an isolated, fixed set of finite 
steps that capture the essence of an algorithm seems 
to persist. As Niklas Wirth wrote: “The power of 
recursion evidently lies in the possibility of defining an 
infinite set of objects by a finite statement” (Wirth, 
1976, p. 126). If infinity is at the core play of 
algorithms, it becomes tempting to have the 
assurance of the identity of the algorithm. There is an 
opposition between the fixed, the “actual” algorithm 
and the accidental quality of its products. Nake writes: 
“Each and every individual piece of 
algorithmic art is no more than only one 
instance of the potentially infinitely many from 
the class of works defined by the algorithm … 
each of its visual products is a shadow only of 
the algorithm. It is one of its traces, a left-over, 
a consolation for those who need to see 
rather than think. If you want to find the 
masterpiece, you must compare algorithms.” 
(Nake, 2010, pp. 56–57) 
The platonic metaphor of the shadow implies that the 
materialisations and renderings of an algorithm are 
inferior to their ideal origin, only there for those who 
are incapable of the cognitive work of its discovery. 
But is this not indeed a form of mystification? What 
would that cognitive step of the rediscovery of the 
masterpiece-algorithm be? 
Another way to enquire into the identity of algorithms 
is to ask: “When are two algorithms the same?” This 
question was addressed by a group of 
mathematicians and computer scientists (Blass, 
Dershowitz & Gurevich, 2009). If programs are the 
implementations/shadows of algorithms, when can 
one say, given two programs, that these represent the 
same algorithm? The authors make it clear that the 
situation is very complicated when we allow all kinds 
of algorithms, including distributed and interactive 
ones. And so the attempt to define an equivalence 
relation between two programs begins with a strong 
constraint, considering only deterministic, small-step 
algorithms, formulated as abstract state machines 
(ASM), while the use of any real-world programming 
language would make the comparison impossible 
from the beginning. 
The result of this study is that, even under these 
artificial conditions, several factors remain that 
prevent an unambiguous decision on the equivalence 
of two programs. These factors can be summarised 
as problems of boundary drawing, i.e. deciding which 
element is inside an algorithm and which is outside: 
• Is the algorithm immune to questions of 
realisability on a particular processor? For example, 
certain types of operations would have to be replaced 
by others if they are not available on a processor 
(Blass, Dershowitz, and Gurevich mention a child that 
knows how to subtract numbers but not how to divide 
them). Similarly, are the time and space requirements 
of an algorithm part of it? 
• Is the presentation and formatting of the output 
of an algorithm part of it or not? If two programs use 
different formatting, would they still represent the 
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same algorithm? This becomes crucial as the output 
is fed into another process. 
• Is the type of data processed part of an 
algorithm or not? For example, does a search 
algorithm change its identity if the domain and 
ordering of its data elements changes? 
• Problem of symmetry: A more detailed 
program might be regarded as implementing the 
same algorithm as a more abstract program, but not 
vice versa. 
• Problem of transitivity: We can construct an 
evolutionary series of programs, where each 
successive pair would be considered to implement 
the same algorithm, but when looking at the overall 
drift between the first and last in the series, we would 
not assert equivalence. 
In summary, we certainly have an intuitive notion of 
algorithm, perhaps even inter-subjective if one 
remains within a specific social group, but when 
looking more closely, algorithms will always be 
infected by their actual and prospective 
implementations, their boundaries—what is 
accidental and what is crucial—will shift as we 
change our motivation with which we observe them, 
and their identity dissolves as we couple them to 
other algorithms, giving rise to a “new machine” (von 
Foerster, 1993/2003). The problem of transitivity 
seems particularly interesting, as it may be connected 
to the question of what happens to algorithms as they 
are developed, experimented with, adapted over 
time. To contrast this again with Nake’s writing: 
“Algorithms are … static descriptions of 
dynamic processes … When the algorithmic 
artist designs a work (an algorithm), he writes 
a static text.” (Nake, 2010, p. 57) 
That is not to say that such design may never occur, 
and it may well describe Nake’s own approach to the 
algorithmic, but I would argue that this is in stark 
contrast to the reality of most coding practices. 
3 | THE RECONFIGURATIVE NATURE OF 
ALGORITHMS 
If the hypothesis is that the algorithmic is in constant 
flux, and if we factor out the identity of the 
masterpiece as a superficial effect of the economy of 
the art system, we may proactively work with this 
hypothesis. I want to exemplify this with a pair of 
works, the sound installation Writing Machine from 
2011 and its reconfiguration as Wr_t_ng M_ch_n_ in 
2017. What is shown is that, even if we begin with the 
aim of recreating a particular algorithm, we are soon 
enmeshed with the dynamics of actualisations, and 
moreover, paradoxically, we need to actively seek 
realignments with the machinery to preserve the 
algorithmic quality of a piece. 
The first piece, described in more detail in Rutz 
(2012), was created around Derrida’s term 
“grapheme” as the trace of abstract, trans-linguistic 
writing. A sound gesture without intentional origin is 
continually rewritten by replacing parts of it with other 
sound fragments that appear to be similar to what is 
being overwritten. As time progresses, the aimless 
drift in the gesture is perceived, the motion being only 
guided by the similarity search. This description for 
the most part still applies to the new piece, the main 
difference being that now a multitude of gestures 
coexists. 
Figure 1 shows photos of the installations, obviously 
being very similar visually, but also with apparent 
dissimilarities: Table (square vs. round) and lighting 
(subdued in black cube vs. bright in white cube) were 
  
 




givens rather than controlled decisions, but the 
meditative framing of the old piece was emphasised 
with the empty centre of the circular arrangement, the 
symbolic absence of a centre that at once evokes the 
centre, whereas in the new piece the computer 
infrastructure was dumped in the centre of the table, 
producing a deliberate messiness.  
No decision is isolated but part of the texture of 
reconfiguration (cf. Rutz, 2016), it is part of a 
particular trajectory that prepares the decision. The 
main new element was the reimplementation of the 
composition on a set of small networked computers 
instead of the central instance that had been used 
before. I felt at unease with the monistic, centripetal 
approach, especially after having worked on the 
project Schwärmen + Vernetzen (Castillo, 
Grossegger & Rutz, 2017), which explored the idea 
of networking and distribution. Here a tower of small 
networked computers was first used, and I transferred 
that element to Wr_t_ng M_ch_n_, with six computers 
running twelve agents, each agent feeding sound to 
six linked Petri dishes with piezo discs coupled to 
their lids, and a seventh computer responsible for 
distributing an FM radio signal (replacing a television 
feed in the old piece). To show the computers with 
their individual blinking patterns, the radio antenna, 
the network cables, the amplifiers and impedance 
matching coils, instead of hiding them under the table, 
exposed them to a possible reading by the visitors 
and counteracted the rigour of the circular 
arrangement. After installing both pieces, I would not 
be able to say that one supersedes the other, they are 
simply similar and different at the same time. 
On the software side of Wr_t_ng M_ch_n_, I began 
with the 2011 code base, attempting first to bring all 
its library dependencies up to date. That proved 
impossible, unless I would recompile old versions of 
some of the libraries, forcing myself to cling to 
obsolete application programming interfaces (API), 
an option quickly dismissed when considering the 
necessary reconfiguration for a networked operation. 
On the other hand, combing through the old 
 
Figure 2 | Left: Code base of Writing Machine. Right: Code base of Wr_t_ng M_ch_n_. 
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codebase refreshed my memory of how the 
algorithms were in fact implemented, so the 
actualisation became a reading exercise despite its 
abortion. Eventually, I rewrote all the code from 
scratch, or almost from scratch, as a few abstractions 
could be reused without change, and some of the 
networking protocols were adopted from Schwärmen 
+ Vernetzen. 
Figure 2 shows a graphical representation of both the 
old and the new code base side by side. Each square 
corresponds to a source code file and most of the 
time one module or class defined in that file. The 
source code has been parsed into an abstract syntax 
tree (AST), which is then rendered as a treemap 
(Bruls, Huizing & Wijk, 2000), using different colours 
for the types of nodes, which are nested as one 
descends to the bottom of the tree. For example, 
class, method and value definitions begin in dark 
violet, terms are in orange, parameters and types in 
green, literals in light blue. While this does not allow 
one to read the source code from a distance, it gives 
a good overall view of the structure of the code, and 
one can make out some similarities and differences. 
The code I wrote in 2011 follows a strict pattern of 
defining for each module an abstract interface—these 
are the tiny boxes at the bottom—an abstract 
implementation of the behaviour minus the basic 
parameters, and the final implementation that 
combines the abstract implementation with the 
parameters. In 2017, as it was much clearer to me 
how to tackle the implementation, I proceeded faster 
and reduced the number of interfaces, not 
distinguishing between abstract and final 
implementation. As a result, the number of modules 
decreased from 56 to 37. However, the code base is 
smaller, and in the new version generally more 
functionality is put into each module. 
The piece follows the idea of real computation time, 
that is to say, calculations are performed detached 
from the “real-time” of the audible audio synthesis, 
and they happen asynchronously and just as fast as 
the computer can compute. In the old version, these 
asynchronous calculations are often represented as 
procedures, nested and concatenated through loops 
and functions, visible in the image as yellow-orange 
strips, e.g. in the implementation of the sound 
memory ‘Database’ in the top left box, the sound 
gesture ’Overwrite’ procedure, the primary algorithm 
loop in the box left to ‘Break’ in the forth row, or the 
handling of the ‘Live Signal’. In the new piece, signal 
processing is done with a unit generator (UGen) 
based system FScape similar to the real-time 
processing (Rutz & Höldrich, 2017), giving rise to a 
readily recognisable pattern of no or little nesting but 
many intermediate variables (dark violet) in the boxes 
labelled ‘Break’ (determining the point of change 
within current sound gesture where an overwriting 
should take place), ‘Match’ (determining the sound 
from the radio buffer most similar to the portion that is 
being overwritten) and ‘Ovrwrt’ (performing the sound 
replacement), here embedded into the primary 
algorithmic loop as opposed to a standalone module 
‘Overwrite’ in the old version. 
There is a strange tension or inversion at work, 
because the largely rewritten code is fundamentally 
different to the old code, but still tries to reinstate most 
of the old algorithms. Would that not be a counter-
example that shows that there is this identity of 
algorithms and an equivalence relation between two 
programs? This is a misunderstanding that ignores 
the dynamics of the actualisation. Two ways to frame 
this dynamics are Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and 
Repetition (1968/1994), and Hans-Jörg 
Rheinberger’s Differential Reproduction (1997, ch. 5). 
Below the symmetrical, empty repetition, the spatial-
temporal echo that preserves the identity of a 
concept, a more fundamental, asymmetrical process 
is at work, aimed at the upholding of productivity. 
For a better understanding, let us imagine that I would 
have rebuilt the original piece; made the minimal 
adjustments to the old software to run it again on a 
computer and sound hardware matching the original 
specification. Would the outcome be a display of the 
original piece? I argue that this is not the case for two 
reasons: The first has to do with the problematic 
boundary between the apparatus of the artistic 
production, which includes the set of technical 
objects, myself, and all relations between these, and 
the object, the piece produced. Both Rheinberger as 
also Karen Barad (2007) state that no fixed object-
apparatus distinction exists, but that it rather emerges 
from the practical work of this ensemble. Barad says 
that this distinction is enacted by an “agential cut”, 
Rheinberger captures this act of cutting with the term 
“subduction” which relates to “the interface between 
the agents of knowing and the objects of their desire” 
(Rheinberger, 2011, p. 337) [3]. The piece, to not be 
a dead artefact but an actual aesthetic object, is re-
enacted by its reinstallation and the renewed 
investment of energy and “tending” in the 
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actualisation. Myself-as-a-machine is not the same 
as it was six years ago, and so for the ensemble-
machine not to break, a realignment is required. The 
de-emphasis of the centre, by giving each sector of 
the circle its own sound memory, by replacing the 
single computation process with a distributed one, 
was such a realignment that made the piece “work” 
again for me. The act of realignment became very 
obvious to me during the exhibition opening, when I 
was explaining and describing the piece to the 
visitors, which was another crucial actualisation as 
important as the actualisation of the code. Which 
elements were central and why, and what were the 
relationships among them had certainly changed 
since 2011. 
The second reason for the impossibility of recovering 
the original piece is specific to the medium, 
algorithmic art. The graphematic process of the 
continuous rewriting of sonic traces is not just the 
“content” of the piece, but an ongoing re-entry of the 
medium into its form. In other words, the piece wants 
to say something about the algorithmic itself. The 
claim will be, as outlined in the next section, that the 
algorithmic is about a radical connectivity and the 
defiance of the halting problem, always producing 
spatio-temporalities of imperfection or material 
excess, i.e. non-empty repetitions. Consequently, to 
quit the agential dance of this excess, to not seek an 
active alignment with the algorithmic-other-as-
machine, would produce the same kind of breakage 
as the abortion of “self-alignment”. 
 
4 | BREAKS AND ALIGNMENTS 
How can we conceive the excess of the algorithmic, 
a genuine productivity that is not pre-programmed as 
a logical disposition? One possibility is to propose 
speculative reasoning as a source of novelty (Parisi, 
2013, §1.5), another is to endow it with the aliveness 
of intra-actions (Barad, 2007, p. 177), where 
actualisations reconfigure the field of possibilities, 
always both closing some while creating new ones. A 
third way would be to interpret the algorithmic in terms 
of Deleuze and Guattari’s desiring-machines 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, ch. 1). These machines 
are at the core of their construction and in opposition 
to the body-without-organs. The structure becomes 
tripartite as one moves to the level of operations: the 
production of production or connective synthesis that 
determines the desiring-machine, the production of 
recording or disjunctive synthesis that determines the 
body-without-organs, and the production of 
consumption or conjunctive synthesis that 
determines a residual subject. The purpose is not to 
equate these with the agency of algorithms, but to 
take them as a useful structure to locate similar 
properties. 
For example, if we think about the duality of the 
algorithmic/algorithms as the medium/form 
distinction, viewing production of production as an 
undifferentiated production/product pair is fitting. If 
“everything stops dead for a moment” to allow for the 
hypothetical observation of the unobservable, we 
would see a pure connectedness in this medium-
machine. The nature of this machine is to desire to be 
coupled to another machine, the coupling enacts at 
the same time a continuity—the system theorist’s 
operational closure—and the possibility of a break or 
interruption. These breakpoints could perhaps be 
seen as the locus of reconfiguration, where a gap or 
irrelativity can be produced. In these breaks, the 
“problem” of transitivity is manifested: “Repetition can 
always be ‘represented’ as extreme resemblance or 
perfect equivalence, but the fact that one can pass by 
degrees from one thing to another does not prevent 
their being different in kind.” (Deleuze, 1968/1994, p. 
2). Furthermore, we are warned against trying to 
understand the algorithmic as a totality, instead 
desiring-machines produce pure multiplicities, so 
there is a radical openness that, in my reading, is also 
an openness for alignments between humans and 
machines. 
Another useful hint is the reference to Claude Lévi-
Strauss’ bricoleur, who is continually involved in the 
reconfiguration of elements, showing “an indifference 
toward the act of producing and toward the product” 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 7). Lévi-Strauss and 
others have of course compared the image of the 
bricoleur with the artist or the researcher. The project 
or produce, the “engineering view”, only enters the 
picture as we transition from the inner to the surficial 
machine, to the surface of recording or distribution, 
where production is deliberately inhibited to register 
and valuate. It is here, where the disputed element of 
violence is added to algorithms, where the algorithmic 
becomes infected by power structures. 
The strategy of addressing, as artists, this transition 
would be to make recognisable the two-layered 
construction, thereby making recognisable the 
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potentially parasitic, manipulative order of the 
recording grid. This strategy would involve an 
alignment with and articulation of the flows and 
interruptions of the desiring-machine. It would involve 
prioritising laws of the inside over laws of the surface, 
for example the notion of motion over the pair of 
control/communication, the affirmative alignment of 
human/machine over their opposition (cf. Downey, 
Dumit & Williams, 1995); it would involve, for 
example, not to teach machines to humanise their 
way of listening, but to teach ourselves to machinise 
our way of listening. One such alignment that I want 
to outline in the next sections is through halting 
operations. 
5 | HALTING OPERATIONS 
In computer theory, the classical halting problem (cf. 
Chaitin, 1982) is that there is no known general 
procedure to determine whether the execution of an 
algorithm comes to a halt. It implies that the desired 
operation of an algorithm is to ultimately determine a 
target state. In contrast, we see halts from a crashing 
machine, or halts caused by the engineer stopping an 
unwanted operation, as anomalies. When speaking 
of the halting problem, one must first make clear what 
type of halt is desired. Similarly, within their abstract 
machines, Deleuze and Guattari distinguish different 
types of breaks, related to the tripartite production: A 
cut of extraction, diversion or sampling (prélèvement) 
[4], a cut of detachment that denotes the transition to 
the recording surface, and a residual cut to produce 
a subject. The cut of the halting “problem” would be 
the detachment, which blocks the further circulation 
and production. The cut we are interested in is the 
prélèvement, the possibility to create a bend in a flow, 
to redirect it, to differentially repeat it. 
Under the extensive model of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
machines, a human is also a system of flows and 
breaks, and likewise we could establish a halting 
problem, perhaps thinking primarily of the residual 
cuts. The problem then is identity, which does not 
exist except retroactively by recording the trajectory 
of states enacted by these cuts. Instead of addressing 
the engineer’s halting problem, we accept that this 
question is not decidable, experimenting instead with 
halting operations on the level of prélèvement. We 
may then draw a tableau of breaks and interruptions, 
not as final selections, as actualisations of some 
virtual, but, for example, as acts of abandonment. I 
understand abandonment here as a form of 
establishing transparency and permeability, 
surrendering elements to their own movements and 
mutual penetration, their release from a prior syntax. 
Such abandonment could either be understood as un-
selection, the movement to a point where something 
excluded is allowed into the picture, or as non-
selection, the non-compliance with the proposition 
that there is something to be selected at all. 
These two types are presented by looking at specific 
elements of an artistic research project that led up to 
an exhibition titled Imperfect Reconstruction, realised 
in 2016 as a collaboration between two sound and 
digital artists and a stage designer (Rutz, 2017). 
6 | UN-SELECTION 
In this project, the exhibition space was divided by a 
three-dimensional mesh structure into an inner and 
an outer space. In the outer space, a 48-channel 
sound installation is heard, and one can see the mesh 
as a contiguous projection surface for a set of 
connected real-time video works. The mesh is 
interrupted at two points, allowing one to enter the 
inner space, characterised by a red surface and an 
installation of eight quadratic screens, four of them 
mounted horizontally, and four suspended vertically. 
They show a series of video miniatures, each of which 
follows a different algorithmic process. 
One of these miniatures is the work Moor [5], based 
on recordings made in a nature reserve of moorlands. 
No special provisions had been made; the footage 
was collected with a photo camera and without tripod. 
From a deer stand, one could see all across the moor, 
and I attempted to make a very slow and steady 
panoramic movement. It was very cold, and I could 
not hold my hand still at all times. Every time I noticed 
my hand was making too abrupt a movement, I 
stopped and repeated from a previous position. I 
anticipated an eventual selection process; I had the 
vague idea of being able to cut the selected material 
into one continuous and smooth shot. Everyone who 
makes sound, video or photographic recordings has 
this instinct of gathering a surplus, as subsequent 
software processes are based on operations of 
selection. 
The algorithm applied to this footage entered through 
a detour. A month before, I had taken down a show 
that included a text in white vinyl lettering attached to 
a wall. Soon I realised that the removal of the letters 
was tedious and would take a long time, and it would 
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leave the wall, which had been only superficially 
painted, with white scratches from the underlying 
colour layer. I interrupted the process, installed a 
photo camera, and began taking photographs for 
each successive row—later column—of text 
removed, turning the wall into an abstract text (Figure 
3). The plan was to create an animated series of the 
photographs.  
Looking at the figure, one can see that a change in 
lighting occurred, but another problem was more 
severe: The camera moved slightly between pictures, 
and for such undertaking the pictures would have to 
be perfectly aligned. I began writing a software for 
realignment, first by allowing the manual scaling and 
translation, visually monitoring the result through 
XOR difference images of the pairwise photos. It was 
not possible to achieve complete matches. I added a 
rotational parameter, then a perspective transform, 
but an automatic brute force search to find the best 
parameters did not converge in reasonable time, and 
so I consulted literature on the subject. A group of 
researchers that were assessing the damage of 
hurricanes by comparing satellite images were 
looking for an algorithm to automatically align images 
that were generally taken from different angles 
(Thomas, Kareem & Bowyer, 2012). They came up 
with a multi-stage process, and I started 
implementing the first stage, the coarse registration. 
The idea is to calculate a phase diagram and 
 
 
Figure 3 | 1st (top) and 35th (bottom) photograph in the vinyl text removal action. 
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determine the coordinate with the highest pixel value 
as indicator of the sought translation transform. The 
proposed algorithm would also use a brute force trial 
of rotation angles, a step that I did not implement, as 
rotation seemed irrelevant in my case. With strongly 
related images, the phase correlation diagram would 
give one sharp bright spot of only a few pixels extent. 
Figure 4 shows such a diagram, with contrast 
enhanced to show the background structure more 
clearly that represents all the changes occurring 
between the two images. The white peak is off-centre 
towards the top-right, indicating that the camera 
performed a pan towards the bottom-left between the 
first and the second picture.  
Once these phase diagrams were correctly produced, 
I un-selected all the sophisticated next steps 
proposed in the paper, and instead extended the 
procedure to videos, applying the process pairwise 
and integrating the translations. I returned to the Moor 
piece. The footage being a pan, integrating the 
translations results in the image completely leaving 
the frame to the left in the beginning and to the right 
in the end of the sequence, so a linear counter motion 
was added as a measure to keep the image within 
bounds while still stabilising the motion. I rendered 
the background black on top of which the translated 
frames were placed, and something very interesting 
happened: As the average speed of rotating the 
camera by hand was not constant, the pan is 
sometimes “ahead of time”, sometimes lagging 
behind. As a result, a new dramaturgy or filmic 
element is added by a changing vignette. While it is 
easy to anticipate that this would happen from simply 
analysing the consequences of the algorithm, the 
actual effect—the way it unfolds and interacts with the 
image, the way it shows a particular rhythm—can only 
be experienced when seeing the resulting video 
(Figure 5).  
Another particular interaction between the material, 
the context, and the algorithm occurred, and it was 
precisely articulated by the action of un-selecting the 
subsequent steps of its implementation, un-selecting 
the full perspective alignment: During the actions of 
readjusting my arm, the camera was impinged and it 
produced, for a brief moment, a blurred image and 
slight rotations around its own axis. The algorithm 
“works” and “breaks down” at the same time. It 
stabilises the translation at the same time as it 
maintains the perspective distortion which it does not 
address. The resulting phenomenon transposes the 
viewed scenery from a credible “immersed” mode of 
perception—credible in terms of the spatiality of the 
landscape—into a “mediated” mode of perception, 
where the landscape becomes almost like a postcard 
that is being torn apart, or like something separated 
 




Figure 5 | Still from Moor (top) and assemblage of key frames 
(bottom) showing the relative translations. 
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from the viewer by a lens apparatus which is now 
revealing its intermediate existence [6]. 
The intervention of un-selection, suspending a pro-
gram at an appropriate moment, is thus producing a 
crucial bend in the original flow, it is an affirmative 
action and not simply to be thought negatively as a 
lack of completing an original algorithm. It is a refusal 
of the completeness criterion of selection. 
7 | NON-SELECTION 
Another piece of the series has the working title Site. 
It relates to long-term exposure. In this type of 
exposure, things that happen disparately across time 
are assembled in a single tableau. For me, it was a 
metaphor of exposing process, to include all the 
traces of the processes that can only be understood 
as ongoing, durational, iterative things into which we 
“tap” when we frame a project.  
Between the beginning of Imperfect Reconstruction 
and its exhibition, I was involved in a different 
collaborative project, in which one of the fellow artists 
used an actual long-term exposure process through 
analogue pinhole cameras. As a partial response to 
this, I started experimenting with a digital camera 
module that I placed in various places, taking interval 
photographs and integrating them with an algorithm 
in a manner somewhat opposed to the analogue 
integration: Instead of averaging the images over 
time, I applied a sliding time window median filter that 
selected or amplified only those pixels that 
constituted changes in the camera’s view. This 
process produced very curious images that reflected 
the changes happening over time, changes that are 
often not obvious to the eye, such as the movement 
of light, clouds, reflections… (Figure 6). 
In Site, I was interested in understanding how this 
process could be translated to moving image or 
video. I began experimenting with ways of duplicating 
the sliding window filter as a means to walk through 
time. The photos being taken every five or so 
seconds, one starts with a time-lapse video that is 
quite rapid. I finally applied an audio resampling 
algorithm, using a band-limited sinc filter, based on 
time series of each pixel position, slowing down the 
time-lapse, until it reached a point of sufficient 
calmness.  
The particular noisiness and somehow inversion of 
contrast due to the amplification of differences met 
another peculiar behaviour: As people walk by the 
camera’s field of view, individual snapshots capture 
the passers-by, while the preceding and successive 
photos do not show them. There is a reason sinc 
interpolation [7] is not used in video editing software. 
It is a resource hungry algorithm, as theoretically the 
filter kernel is infinite, making it so that every point in 
time contributes to the interpolated value at any 
instant. The sinc function also brings out the Gibbs 
effect (Figure 7), an over- and undershooting when 
the input signal sharply changes, as the samples left 
  
Figure 6 | Single photo and differential integration of 269 frames. 
 
Figure 7 | Gibbs phenomenon, showing over- and undershoot, as 
abrupt changes undergo a sinc interpolation. 
 Journal of Science and Technology of the Arts, Volume 9, No. 3 – Special Issue: xCoAx 2017 
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and right of the slope are alternately weighted with 
positive and negative coefficients. This phenomenon 
produced a strange darkness-brightness oscillation of 
the passers-by just before their appearance and just 
after their disappearance. One gets the impression of 
contours being “raised” or “falling” cardboard cut-
outs. This combines with a particular illuminated 
green-yellow colour stemming from an unevenness in 
the camera’s RGB gain stages, resembling phosphor 
(Figure 8) [8].  
It would have been easy to swap the resampling 
algorithm for another one “more suitable” to video 
processing, as it would have been easy to adjust the 
RGB gains or apply a post-production correction. 
Although none of these elements were planned or 
prior conceptualised, they gave rise to the particular 
quality that would be otherwise lost. I simply let go, I 
let the process run the way “it” came to run, as an act 
of my own non-selection. 
The intervention of non-selection, sustaining an 
“inappropriate” outcome of a program, is thus 
crucially tapping into the original flow before it would 
normally be corrected, it is again an affirmative action 
and not a lack of allegiance to an original algorithm. It 
is a refusal of the imperative criterion of selection. 
8 | GIVING SUPPORT, SEEKING SUPPORT 
How do these operations translate to the critical 
perception of the audience? What is needed to make 
our alignments recognisable? First of all, it is 
important to note that alignment with the algorithmic 
and the otherness of the algorithmic are not in 
contradiction. If I say becoming-machine, it does not 
mean that we cease to be human, but that we 
understand that the engineering perspective on 
algorithms is a surface effect, and that humans and 
algorithms are not separate ex ante. Returning to the 
question of responsibility, the “ability to respond to the 
other”, the “ethical subject is not the disembodied 
rational subject of traditional ethics but rather an 
embodied sensibility, which responds to its proximal 
relationship to the other through a mode of 
wonderment that is antecedent to consciousness.” 
(Barad, 2007, pp. 391–392). Then to repeat that 
relation, extending it to the audience means to 
attempt to instil that same mode. Halting points not 
only indicate the diversion and repetition of flows, but 
also moments of rest, a fourth type of cut that 
suspends and defers. The German word halten is not 
just to stop, but Halt also signifies support (to hold). 
Enacting halting operations could thus also mean to 
give support (Halt geben), and it expects a 
counterpart that seeks support (Halt suchen). 
What this support must achieve is to intervene and go 
between the body-without-organs, the “appropriating” 
and “arrogating” forces (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 
10) that try to presuppose their authority on the 
algorithmic, e.g. the Big Data economy or the 
commodification of algorithmic ubiquity, and the 
audience. For instance, if one locates the point where 
the credible becomes incredible, seemingly small 
interventions can strongly intensify the sense of the 
own temporality and dynamics of the algorithmic, a 
sense of reciprocally relating. An example of the 
transition from credible to incredible was given in 
      
Figure 8 | Example key frames from Site, showing the Gibbs oscillation as a person enters the picture, with second and forth image 




Moor, where an immersive (maybe Deleuze and 
Guattari’s “miraculate”?) perception is suddenly 
interrupted by the mediated spatiality of the 
algorithmic process itself. Sound installation pioneer 
Max Neuhaus used the term ‘plausible’ which seems 
very close to ‘credible’, and he works specifically with 
the moment where the plausible breaks down: 
“I often make a sound which is almost 
plausible within its context when you first 
encounter it. The point where a person 
realizes that it is not plausible is when he 
jumps into the piece; he’s swimming on his 
own from then on.” (Neuhaus, 1993/94, p. 98) 
The plausible, the probable enters the disjunctive 
synthesis as a way to deal with complexity, the 
engineer’s way of rationalising what has already 
become miraculous. The persuasiveness of the 
plausible, oscillating between the absurd and the 
evident, is that its assumption, at least in everyday 
context, requires no specific competency—“it sounds 
plausible” (cf. Böhnert & Reszke, 2015). Our 
embodied sensibility, the balancing act, can be a 
critical tool, where a culture is increasingly 
undermined by the corruption of the plausible in the 
form of “filter bubbles” and “fake news”. 
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ENDNOTES 
[1] Ironically, Galanter was later accused of an 
imprecise use of the term fractal that was a 
mathematical abstraction and thus could not, as he 
claimed, be found as such in nature. 
[2] A Google search for the former phrase yields a 
vast number of results, ranging from “leadership 
development”, “music”, “life”, and “democracy”, 
through to “fairness and transparency”, “the 
quantified self”, and “advertising and media”, to name 
but a few, all placed “in the age of the algorithm”. The 
latter paraphrase was voiced during a discussion 
round of the Schwärmen + Vernetzen exhibition. 
[3] This is framed in terms of epistemology, which 
however is not seen as separate from the material 
world, and Barad uses the condensation of 
“ontoepistemology”. I would also include “aesthetic 
knowledge/experience” here. 
[4] Prélèvement seems much better translated in 
German as Entnahme, such as taking a (blood) 
sample, temporarily diverting a flow, than the English 
translations of slicing off or portioning. 
[5] The titles are convenient work titles as the series 
has never been taken apart into “individuals”. 
[6] The following link leads to a page containing a 
short video excerpt in which the phenomenon can be 
witnessed: 
https://www.researchcatalogue.net/view/245942/249
036 (accessed 29-Oct-2017). 
[7] The sinus cardinalis or sinc function is (sin x)/x, 
producing a decaying oscillation around the zero 
point. 
[8] The following link leads to a page containing a 
short video excerpt in which the phenomenon can be 
witnessed: 
https://www.researchcatalogue.net/view/245942/314
773 (accessed 29-Oct-2017). 
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